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1 Introduction
Foreign migration to Spain is relatively recent and so, consequently, are
policies related to both immigration1 and the integration of immigrants.
The first law dealing with these issues was the Ley de Extranjería, a law
on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain (from herein simply re-
ferred to as the Foreigners Law) that was enacted in 1985, just a year be-
fore Spain joined the European Communities. At that time, there were
merely 250,000 legal foreign residents in the country (Watts 1998: 661).
During the last two decades, however, immigration flows have swelled sig-
nificantly to produce a completely new demographic situation. Today the
nation hosts more than 4.5 million foreign residents, which represents
about 10 per cent of the total population.2 This makes Spain one of the
European Union’s leading immigration countries. Spain’s percentage of im-
migrants in relation to its total population has reached a level comparable
to that of other North-Western European countries. Growth has been espe-
cially visible in certain regions such as Madrid, Catalonia, Andalusia,
Murcia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands. This particu-
lar background makes the Spanish case an interesting one to contrast with
other North-Western and Central European countries. A long-standing tra-
dition of emigration that lasted up until just recently and the increasing
momentum that immigration has gathered in two decades have geared
Spanish policymaking to a starting point distinct from those that came be-
fore it.
Studying Spanish policymaking in these fields is not easy. Although
there is a fast-growing body of scientific literature on Spanish immigration
and the social processes of newcomers’ integration into Spanish society, lit-
tle research has been systematically undertaken to examine the processes
of how policies in these fields are made (Agrela Romero & Gil Araujo
2005; Carrillo & Delgado 1998; Casey 1998c; Lopez Sala 2005b; Morén-
Alegret 2005b; Ramos, Bazaga, Delgado & Del Pino 1998; Ramos &
Bazaga 2002; Ruiz Vieytez 2003; Tamayo & Delgado 1998; Tamayo &
Carrillo 2002; Zapata-Barrero 2002, 2003a; Kreienbrink 2008). Most litera-
ture on policy deals with the content of policies. Even works that specifi-
cally focus on the making of policies do not offer a comprehensive view:
focus falls either solely on immigration or integration; merely one aspect
of either field is analysed; or only a static description is given of relations
between actors at a given moment in time.
For background, we will first outline the principal characteristics of im-
migration in Spain. Next will come a bird’s-eye view of the evolution of
migration and integration policies. In the following sections, we will zoom
in on immigration policies and integration policies. We will delve not only
into their formal content as laid down in official documents, but also
explore their implementation, thereby describing wherever possible which
actors are involved. On the basis of previously scattered information, our
endeavour is to produce a basic description of the process of policymaking
in the fields of Spanish immigration and integration.
2 Background and characteristics of immigration in Spain
For most of the twentieth century, internal migration and international emi-
gration were key factors determining the distribution of Spain’s population
at a given time. Both flows were mainly rural-urban ones. Catalonia, the
Madrid Metropolitan Area and the Basque Country (the three regions
where most industry was concentrated) were the nation’s main areas of
destination, while Andalusia, Extremadura and Galicia experienced the
most emigration. Spain’s international emigrants departed for urban areas
in European countries such as Germany and France, as well as some Latin
American countries. This resulted in an unequal distribution of the popula-
tion never before paralleled.
It was only in the mid-1980s that the country experienced a visible re-
versal of migration patterns. Explaining why countries such as Spain, Italy,
Portugal and Greece became immigration destinations during the 1980s
and 1990s, King, Fielding and Black (1997) point to internal migration
patterns and the demand for labour. Their model highlights three specific
trends from the 1950s to the 1990s: the coexistence of high- and low-
productivity sectors; the rapid transfer of indigenous workers from low- to
high-productivity sectors through short- or long-distance migration; and the
rapid decline of an available supply of indigenous labour in rural areas.
The late 1980s and 1990s ushered in a new phase for Spain altogether, as
a reduced rate of investment was combined with economic restructuring,
recession and high unemployment. Since low wages were the only means
for businesses to retain a competitive edge, employers turned to immigrant
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workers. Labour immigration to Southern Europe was thus not only a mat-
ter of supply, but also a particular response to employers’ demands for
cheap labour (Calavita 2005: 68). As shown in Table 8.1, immigration rose
to unprecedented levels, notably beginning in 2000. This rapid growth was
linked to a booming Spanish economy driven by expansion of the housing
market (and subsequent construction industry) as well as Spain’s strong
foothold in the tourist industry. These economic developments went hand
in hand with the government’s rather lenient immigration policy.
The present-day immigrant population – with its more than four million
people registered in local censuses, which also includes undocumented im-
migrants – presents very diverse origins. As shown in Table 8.2, the largest
groups are Moroccans and Ecuadorians, each comprising a total of ap-
proximately half a million. Romanians, Colombians and British nationals
each comprise over one quarter of a million. Many other nationalities are
represented in another two million foreigners. As the table also shows,
there is a sizeable immigrant population from the EU-25, of which a signif-
icant part corresponds to the migration of pensioners of North-Western
Europe (mostly from the United Kingdom and Germany). Moreover, there
is a sizeable new immigration of economic migrants from Central and
Table 8.1 Annual inflow of foreigners in Spain, 1998 – 2006
Annual inflow
of foreigners
Year
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
57,195 330,881 443,085 645,844 802,971
Source: Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales, National Institute of Statistics (INE 2007)
Table 8.2 Foreign population according to local register, 1 January 2006
Origin Foreign population
Europe 1,609,856
EU-25 918,886
UK 274,722
Rest Europe 690,970
Romania 407,159
Africa 785,279
Morocco 563,012
The Americas 1,528,077
Ecuador 461,310
Asia 217,918
China 104,681
Oceania 2,363
Australia 1,633
Total 4,144,166
Source: National Institute of Statistics (2006)
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Eastern Europe, namely Romania and Bulgaria. Latin Americans account
for another important share of immigrants, their high percentages being a
reflection of preferential treatment in legislation as well as the effects of re-
viving old social networks.
In terms of economic sectors, the majority of migrant workers from out-
side the EU are concentrated in services (58.1 per cent), construction (24.6
per cent), industry (11.1 per cent) and agriculture (6.2 per cent) (Pajares
2007: 52). If we analyse these figures according to gender, we find that
42.3 per cent of the total of male foreign workers have jobs in construction
while 89.7 per cent of the total of female foreign workers are in the service
sector – more than half of them in domestic employment and nearly less
than half in commerce (Pajares 2007: 52). In terms of concentration by ori-
gin, the rotation or displacement of certain collectives in specific sectors or
provinces should be remarked upon. For example, in 2002, Moroccans
were displaced by Ecuadorians in the countryside of Murcia and by women
workers from Poland and Romania who came to pick strawberries in
Huelva (Cachón 2003: 264). Increased immigration from Latin America
has also meant there are more women domestic workers from Ecuador,
Bolivia and Peru. Finally, the position of immigrants in the labour market
also depends on the time of legal residence: while newcomers or recently
regularised immigrants represent the majority in sectors like agriculture or
domestic service, after an initial period of legal residence, migrant workers
tend to move into sectors like construction as well as, in the case of wo-
men, other services (Pajares 2007: 51).
3 Legal framework and the evolution of migration and
integration policies
From a legal perspective, the evolution of Spanish immigration and inte-
gration policies can be divided into four different phases, each correspond-
ing to major legislative events. Running from the mid-1980s until the early
1990s, the initial period produced a first generation of laws on immigra-
tion, including the first Foreigners Law. Spanning most of the 1990s, the
second phase witnessed the birth of the next generation of immigration
laws and the simultaneous adoption of the first policies on immigrant so-
cial integration. Thirdly, 1999 onwards marks a phase that brought about
significant changes to the Foreigners Law, as well as ushered in a new turn
in integration policies. Finally, 2009 has seen again significant changes in
the basic legislative framework concerning immigration and asylum.
Taking chronological stock of policies on immigration and integration
within a four-generational framework allows us to contextualise them with-
in different historical and political lights. However, grouping policies in
phases for the sake of theoretical comparison does not deny the continuity
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that runs throughout the core of the legal system, particularly in immigra-
tion policies. Although political majorities of every era have inspired either
more progressive or more conservative tendencies, the main guiding princi-
ples of immigration legislation have remained pretty near to those promul-
gated by first regulations. Yet, the number of regulations and the sheer vo-
lume of the main legal texts have increased. Such substantial continuity
cannot be presumed, however, in the field of integration policies. These
emerged only in what we above defined as the second phase of national
policies, and they changed significantly in later phases. Thus, the first gen-
eral trend to be noted is that immigration policies in which central state in-
stitutions are almost exclusive actors show much more continuity than inte-
gration policies whose design and development is influenced by many
more actors and stakeholders at different levels of society.
To reiterate, Spain had primarily been an emigration country and only in
the mid-1980s did its reversal of migration patterns became visible. In
1986, the number of Spanish returnees from abroad was for the first time
higher than the number of Spanish emigrants. In that same year, the num-
ber of foreign immigrants was still growing, though it remained low, at a
level just below 300,000 (Watts 1998: 658, 661). Just the year before, in
1985, the first Foreigners Law3 was passed in the central parliament. The
way these events unfolded indicates that Spain’s full incorporation into the
European Communities in 1986 played a more important role for introdu-
cing the law than any immigration statistics.
Although the main aim of this first substantial regulation was to build a
framework for legal support and to specify conditions of stay for foreigners
in Spain, it also introduced opportunities to restrict entrance. Moreover,
granting residence permits on a one-year basis encouraged the notion of
temporariness to predominate in policies. In view of the earlier absence of
a comprehensive immigration and integration policy at Spain’s central le-
vel, the law was a relative novelty. This marked the birth of the first gen-
eration of legislation.
The 1985 Foreigners Law, however, was not the first regulation to be
born to this generation. In fact, it was preceded by other related pieces of
legislation that were developed in unison and had a bearing on Spain’s
inclusion in the European Community. Thus, the Law on Asylum4 was
passed in 1984 and its implementing regulation5 in 1985. The Foreigners
Law would also be developed through the corresponding developing
regulation in 1986.6 In addition, the Royal Decree of 19867 regulated the
situation of European Economic Community state citizens (‘European’ citi-
zenship, per se, did not exist at that time). To get a complete view on the
legal framework of immigration policies, two important Constitutional
Court rules must be cited. The first is judgement number 107/1984.8 This
ruling, issued prior to the approval of the Foreigners Law, had already clar-
ified the basic rights that would or would not be enjoyed by foreigners,
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according to the new constitutional system. As such, the Constitutional
Court established three different groups of rights, with the recognition that
foreigners could be entitled to enjoy two of them under different
conditions.
According to the court, a first set of fundamental rights had to be
equally recognised for everybody, including foreigners regardless of their
legal situation in the country. These included basic rights such as rights to
life, freedom of expression and judicial guarantees. By contrast, most so-
called political rights (e.g. to vote or to participate directly in public affairs
and responsibilities) were not applicable to foreigners. Article 13.2 of
Spain’s Constitution prohibits such possibilities (the only exception being
the right to vote in local elections if there is a reciprocity agreement with a
foreign resident’s home country). The remaining rights recognised in Title
I of the Spanish Constitution may be extended to foreigners depending on
their legal situation in Spain, and according to what has been established
in the Foreigners Law. The conditionality also applies to differences in
how legislation can regulate the concrete implementation of these rights in
cases concerning foreign inhabitants. This early Constitutional Court ruling
of 1984 would later have an obvious influence on the drafting of the afore-
mentioned legislation.
The second important Constitutional Court judgement is classified as
number 115/1987.9 It was provoked by the national ombudsman, finding
that some articles of the 1985 Foreigners Law, such as those regarding the
right to form associations and to demonstrate,10 did not conform with the
1978 Spanish Constitution. The Constitutional Court ruled partially in fa-
vour of the ombudsman’s position and, as a result, some specific para-
graphs of the law were declared void.
As for Spanish nationality law, many of the country’s constitutions in-
cluded the basic regulations of naturalisation during the nineteenth century.
From the twentieth century up until the present-day, however, the main
bulk of this legislation has been incorporated into the civil code. Reflecting
the legacy of emigration tradition in Spanish society, the criterion for
nationality assignation is more an jus sanguinis model than an jus soli one.
Moreover, in Spanish legal tradition, the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizen-
ship’ are mostly synonymous. According to the regulation in force, for-
eigners can acquire Spanish nationality by residing legally in the country
for a continuous period of ten years. This being a general rule, some ex-
ceptions are also accommodated. For example, only a two-year legal resi-
dence is required to acquire Spanish nationality by nationals from Brazil,
Andorra, Portugal and former Spanish colonies (apart from the Western
Sahara and Morocco), as well as descendents of Spanish Sephardic Jews.
A significant number of immigrants who arrived in Spain within the last
ten to fifteen years have become Spanish nationals; those of Latin
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American origin are among the highest-ranking numbers. This practice
works to minimise the total number of foreigners reflected in the statistics.
As a whole, this bundle of first-generation legislation puts clear-cut em-
phasis on the control of immigration flows and the regulation of formal re-
quirements for foreigners to enter and stay in Spain. After 1985, most for-
eigners were obliged to conform to new, concrete legal stipulations, and
therefore many immigrants would sooner or later fall into an illegal admin-
istrative situation for the first time. Beyond this general rule, both
European Community citizens and asylum seekers enjoyed a privileged
status provided for in specific pieces of legislation. The privileges of asy-
lum provoked a flow of applications from certain groups of immigrants.
However, within a few years, the restrictive interpretation of the asylum
regulations followed by national authorities curbed this tendency.
A significant shift in migration policies is identifiable around 1990. On
26 June of this year, the United Left (IU)11 parliamentary group submitted
a motion to the Congress of Deputies asking for regularisation of those un-
documented foreigners who had resided and worked in Spain for some per-
iod of time. This motion pleaded the right for families to reunite and re-
quested preparation of a draft immigration bill to help realise the right. It
also urged the government to prepare a report on the situation of foreign
immigrants in Spain. The ensuing political discussion thus introduced sig-
nificant elements of integration policies into the discussion. In office at the
time, the Socialist Party (PSOE)12 responded by conveying a communica-
tion to Parliament regarding the situation of foreigners and supplying basic
policy guidelines. On 13 March 1991, almost all parliamentary groups
agreed on a resolution urging the government to organise a regularisation
process and to adopt more legislative and/or administrative integration
measures that would complement the existing framework. The conse-
quence of this resolution was an extraordinary regularisation procedure,
which was instated the following summer. With enthusiastic collaboration
by most relevant social actors, the government received approximately
120,000 applications of undocumented immigrants. Most of these applica-
tions led to residence permits.
After the EU treaty entered into force in 1994, the Law on Asylum was
substantially modified13 and, in 1995, its implementing regulation was also
adapted to the new demands of European inter-governmental agreements
in the field.14 A restrictive view of asylum was thus instated and, since
then, foreign immigrants have hardly used asylum to enter Spain. This
wave of changes did not alter the 1985 Foreigners Law, though it did sig-
nificantly change its developing regulation, which was derogated and sub-
stituted by a new text in 1996.15 Following the main concerns expressed in
previous years both in Parliament and in the public debate, the new 1996
Royal Decree focused on the social integration of immigrants. Indeed, it in-
cluded more specific regulations about family reunification procedures,
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unaccompanied minor immigrants and some basic social rights.
Furthermore, the new developing regulation permitted another regularisa-
tion process for undocumented foreigners.
All such changes were nevertheless still part of a legislation that basi-
cally aimed at immigration control and management. The introduction of
an annual quota or contingent system from 1993 onwards testifies to this.
In practice, however, a very specific relation developed in this period be-
tween regularisations, on the one hand, and the annual quota, on the other;
the regularisations seemed to fill the largest part of the quota.
What did change in this period was the very fact that integration had
arisen as an issue in legislation and policy. Apart from the social aspects
that were introduced in 1996’s new developing regulation of the
Foreigners Law, as mentioned above, three major steps were taken in this
respect. First, the central government started to look at immigration as
more than a mere trans-border flow. As such, integration policies were for
the first time considered and, in 1994, a national strategy was drafted. This
was known as the Plan for Social Integration of Immigrants. With the ben-
efit of hindsight, the document can hardly be considered influential; how-
ever, it was still an important hallmark of the new field of integration pol-
icy. Parallel to this plan, two instruments were created to assist the devel-
opment of social integration policies: the Foro para la Integración Social
de los Inmigrantes, a forum on the social integration of immigrants (from
herein simply referred to as the Forum) and the Observatorio Permanente
de la Inmigración (OPI), the permanent observatory on immigration. The
Forum16 is the supreme government’s consulting body on immigration and
integration policies. It comprises representatives of the public sector and
social organisations involved in the field as well as immigrant associations.
Though in the beginning the Forum lacked ministerial support – besides
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs – its position was subsequently
consolidated to ensure participation by all relevant ministries and institu-
tions in its functioning. OPI was developed as a tool to monitor immigra-
tion and integration and, on the basis of such analysis, suggest policies.
The introduction of integration policies in this period added to the com-
plexity of relations between the different levels of governance in Spain.
Immigration policies remained the exclusive competence of the central in-
stitutions. This decision was made in accordance with Article 149.1.2 of
the 1978 Spanish Constitution, which stated that all legislative and execu-
tive powers related to immigration, asylum, nationality, passports, borders
and aliens are the sole responsibility of the national parliament and govern-
ment. On the flipside, the system generated by the autonomous commu-
nities established a distribution of responsibilities in which the regional
governments were responsible for all key policy vis-à-vis the accommoda-
tion of immigrants.17 This came as the result of transferring responsibilities
from central to regional administrations.18 Thus, autonomous communities
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and municipalities had begun endeavouring to manage immigrant integra-
tion through their own policies in matters such as social welfare, education,
health and housing. Later on, they began to formulate ‘immigration plans’,
referring mainly to certain aspects of integration. As the fifth section in this
chapter shows, in various places such bottom-up initiatives had a range of
contents and forms.
The third phase in the development of legislative initiatives dealing with
immigration started in 1999. The beginning of this period was marked by
political turmoil and changes in government. What emerged was a long so-
cial debate and resounding consensus among political parties that the 1985
Foreigners Law needed to be adapted in view of Spain’s increasing rate of
immigration. A second Foreigners Law, passed by Parliament at the end of
1999,19 was seen by many as a positive turning point. Although it did not
contain very substantial modifications, it intended to change how the quota
functioned in order to effect its instrumentation for labour market policy
and new entry, rather than regularisations. From the social perspective, the
new law recognised a significant number of immigrant rights, including
clear provisions favouring individuals in an illegal situation. Thus, basic
social aspects such as access to education, public health, social benefits
and assistance were guaranteed to all those foreigners residing de facto in
any municipality. Furthermore, legal residents enjoyed a substantial num-
ber of additional rights. This second Foreigners Law entered into force in
2000.
Nevertheless, the political consensus on this new law was not shared by
the conservative People’s Party (PP).20 They argued that this new legisla-
tion provided few possibilities to fight undocumented immigration to Spain
and conceded too many rights to undocumented foreigners. Thus, after the
PP had won the national 2000 elections in an absolute majority and again
came into power,21 its recently elected conservative government showed
no intention of drafting the developing regulation of the new 1999 law. In
fact, it came with a significantly modified law that was accepted with the
help of the PP’s overwhelming majority in December 2000.22 This new
law took three divergent directions. Firstly, legal provisions became more
restrictive, and many fundamental rights were denied for immigrants with-
out a residence permit. Granting resident permits to undocumented immi-
grants already residing in Spain was strongly restricted. Secondly, the
whole regime of issuing sanctions against undocumented foreigners – or
people collaborating with them – became much harsher both on paper and
in procedure. Finally, the discretionary competence given to the govern-
ment to develop the law’s actual content was enormously expanded. On
this basis, the government proceeded to pass an extensive reform of the de-
veloping regulation in 2001.23
In 2000, the government approved a plan for integrating foreign immi-
grants called the Programa Global de Regulación y Coordinación de la
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Inmigración en España, or the global programme of immigration regulation
and coordination in Spain (GRECO).24 This plan was primarily aligned
with the restrictive policy reflected in the PP’s Law of 2000. Having been
based largely on the conception of temporary migration, it thus strongly
emphasised return.
Legislative reforms on immigration under the conservative government
continued with November 2003’s approval of a new set of modifications to
the Foreigners Law.25 The new set contained concrete rules on sanctions,
extended the scope of visa requirements and regulated – and widened – the
opportunity to detain undocumented foreigners in specific centres. Both
the legal reform of December 2000 and the November 2003 Foreigners
Law were challenged before the Constitutional Court for possible viola-
tions of fundamental immigrant rights. These appeals were instigated by
several regional parliaments and governments. While the second appeal
against the November 2003 Foreigners Law is still pending, in November
2007, the Constitutional Court decided that some of the legal reform of
December 2000 articles did indeed violate the fundamental rights of
foreigners.26
The general elections of 2004 ushered in a left-wing parliamentary ma-
jority, a PSOE government and, overall, a new climate with a different
configuration of actors in the field. A new developing regulation of the
Foreigners Law was adopted in December 2004.27
The above-mentioned regional appeals bring to bare something that was
less visible in the earlier Spanish legislative periods. Coming into focus in
the third period was regional authorities’ insistence on influencing policies
at the national level. On the one hand, these initiatives expressed resistance
by some autonomous communities against the restrictive policy implemen-
ted by the central government, especially during the years of the PP gov-
ernment (1996-2004). On the other hand, on the basis of their own policy
initiatives in the field of integration within various regions (Catalonia,
Valencia, Andalusia, Madrid, Navarra and the Basque Country), Catalonia
and other regions claimed more executive powers. But it took until 2006,
upon approval of a new version of Catalonia’s statute of autonomy, to ad-
mit formal participation of the autonomous community in the immigration
process. The Catalonian track was subsequently followed by the amended
Statute of Andalusia. Still, it should be noted that other autonomous com-
munities have shown much less interest in sharing these powers with the
state when amending their statutes (Santolaya 2007).
To a certain extent, this last trend has resulted in the latest generation of
regulations on immigration issues. This very recent phase has primarily en-
tailed a parallel modification of the two main legal instruments in the field,
which were amended in the last quarter of 2009. To begin with, in
October, the Act on Asylum was abrogated and the new Act 12/2009 was
adopted. This legislative change was catalysed by the need to adapt
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Spanish legislation to EU directives, something basically affecting proce-
dural issues. In December, the Foreigners Law was subsequently modified.
The new law incorporates not only some recently issued European direc-
tives on the matter, but also aligns the new act with important decisions
adopted by the Constitutional Court in 2007. The new law seeks to facili-
tate some degree of decentralisation in the implementation of issuing work-
ing permits. In this respect – following what was foreseen in the Statutes
of Catalonia and Andalusia – autonomous communities are given a voice.
This is probably the most significant shift within the fourth generation of
immigration and integration legislation. Nonetheless, this does not mean
that the Foreigners Act fully takes on a pro-integration stance. In essence,
it remains a legal instrument for regulating immigration.
Immigration and integration policies in Spain thus follow relatively di-
vergent ways. The competences of national, regional and local authorities
are different, as are the ranges of actors involved and the subsequent devel-
opment of policies over time. For this reason, it is productive to separately
analyse the policies and their respective developments. In distinct sections
below, we will nonetheless endeavour to indicate where the policy fields
may touch upon – and influence – each other.
4 Immigration policies and policymaking
As stated above, the first generation of regulations dealing with immigra-
tion came about in the mid-1980s. Their emergence had more to do with
Spain’s imminent accession to the European Community than with immi-
gration itself, which was at that time still at a low level. Basically, these
laws and regulations introduced much of the instrumentation for regulation
and control that was earlier developed in European Community countries
in order to satisfy the European bodies. The background and timing of the
immigration policy’s institutionalisation explain how the first Foreigners
Law (1985) was passed without amendment and with virtual unanimity.
These factors also explain why there was hardly any involvement of social,
civic or economic actors in the drafting of these immigration regulations,
nor any significant reaction at the local or regional levels. In terms of pol-
icy effects, the Europeanisation of the first generation of migration regula-
tions produced a permanent conflict between an externally induced restric-
tive policy and the economic situation in Spain, which was characterised in
the 1990s and especially in the 2000s by an increasing demand for un-
skilled labour (Moreno Fuentes 2005: 110).
Despite many changes in the law (in 1985, twice in 2000, in 2001 and
in 2003) and the development of subsequent regulations (in 1986, 1991,
1996, 2001 and 2004), Spain has never resolved the mismatch between its
very restrictive entry policies and simultaneous labour demands. This has
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resulted in the emergence of an irregular immigration model (Izquierdo
2001) and the implementation of frequent regularisation measures endea-
vouring to surface ever-growing stocks of irregular migrants. Moreover,
very short-term residence permits – and the fact that their prolongation is
contingent on a formal work contract – have led many regularised immi-
grants to fall back into irregularity.
A crucial question that must be answered to understand the significance
of immigration regulations and, particularly, their frequent changes is how
these regulations have actually worked. To this end, we will focus not only
on the formulation of measures, but specifically on their implementation
and effects. Inasmuch as immigration policies remain the exclusive compe-
tence of the central government, analysing the formulation and implemen-
tation of entry and regularisation policies enables us to distinguish two
important nuances. First of all, in contrast to entry policies, regularisation
programmes – which, in practice, have been the primary avenue for confer-
ring legal status – have come as the result of bottom-up pressures exerted
in great measure by social actors as well as by regional and local govern-
ments. In this regard, as we will see in the following section, their policy-
making more closely resembles that of integration policies. Secondly, in
terms of implementation, we have observed increasing participation, ever
since 2000, by social actors (particularly employer organisations and trade
unions) and a gradual decentralisation of administrative functions to regio-
nal and local governments. In the following paragraphs, we will analyse
these two key elements of immigration policies.
4.1 Entry
The Foreigners Law of 1985 (in force until 2000) maintained the previous
policy’s practice of submitting each labour migrant entry to administrative
control. Employment of non-EU workers was only permitted if employers
could demonstrate that they were unable to hire any otherwise suitable citi-
zen or resident of the country. In terms of policymaking, this implied that
the evaluation of labour needs was administrative rather than political.
Since this evaluation was undertaken by local public employment offices,
permission for the employment of foreign workers depended on discretion-
ary interpretations and practices of labour market tests. The absence of a
political decision further implied that there was no judicial control on the
implementation of entry policies. In terms of policy implementation and ef-
fects, this work permit policy (referred to as the ‘general regime’) ob-
structed legal entry. This occurred in the following ways: 1) labour market
tests were often conducted in a very restrictive manner; 2) there were no
clear, objective criteria for admission, which meant employers were faced
with excessive uncertainty when it came time to hire; 3) there were insuffi-
cient mechanisms to match labour demand with supply; and 4) even when
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work permit applications were approved, it took months before securing
the actual document.
In order to create new avenues for legal entry, in 1993 the Spanish gov-
ernment launched a quota system. The idea behind this second work permit
system was to create a direct way to enter regularly into Spain without sub-
mitting individual applications to a test of the labour market. This was only
possible in particular economic sectors determined annually by the govern-
ment, and for a maximum number of applications. In contrast to the gener-
al regime, the quota system thus introduced a political evaluation of labour
needs. However, in practice, this system functioned as a regularisation pro-
gramme, as most applications were filed by irregular migrants already in
the country. Once applications were approved, foreign workers went back
to their country of origin (or to a Spanish consulate in Southern France),
applied for a visa and then re-entered into Spain as regular migrants. In
contrast to a regularisation programme proper, prior residence was not
needed, economic sectors were determined by the state and there was a
limited number of annual applications.
From 2000 to 2004, the right-wing government closed off the possibility
of entry through the general regime. Although several court judgements
deemed this illegal – therefore letting entry remain formally open – in
practice, the general regime was no longer an option as labour market tests
were done in a very restrictive manner. In these four years, the government
endeavoured to channel regular migration exclusively through the quota
system. For this purpose, the quota system was modified in two ways.
First, in order to avoid the regularisation of irregular migrants through the
quota system, job offers could only be made through anonymous recruit-
ment. By signing bilateral agreements with countries such as Colombia,
Morocco, Poland, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Romania, the se-
lection process became the responsibility of the individual countries’ gov-
ernments. Second, in order to adapt the annual quota to the requirements
of the labour market, included in the process were regional governments,
employer organisations and trade unions who could help determine the
number and type of workers to be covered under this system. In particular,
employer organisations’ and trade unions’ estimations were evaluated at
the provincial level by regional governments and then proposed for accep-
tance to the Ministry of Labour. In turn, the Ministry was responsible for
the final decision after consultation with the Higher Council on
Immigration Policy.
At this point, it is important to note that the inclusion of regional gov-
ernments in defining the annual quota indicated recognition of their role in
the immigration policymaking process. In practice, however, regional gov-
ernments had rather limited influence. In many cases, regional govern-
ments chose for a zero quota or a very limited one (Catalonia was an ex-
ception), thereby requiring the central government to re-evaluate its
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estimations (Roig Molés 2007: 292). By contrast, employer organisations
and trade unions had a fundamental role. While trade unions took rather re-
strictive positions, employer organisations defended higher quotas.
However, annual quotas have been rather low. To explain this outcome,
Roig Molés refers to the fact that many Spanish employers do not follow
in a tradition of accounting for their future labour needs. Moreover, in
many provinces, employer organisations do not represent the medium and
small companies that have the highest demands for foreign workers (ibid.).
Although proffered by subsequent governments as Spain’s main channel
for legal entry, the quota system offered no more than 20,000 to 40,000
jobs per year. While the annual quota had always been rather limited, the
number of employer applications registered through this system was even
lower. The outcomes may be explained by the rigidities imposed by the an-
nual quota (as established by economic sector, job speciality and province),
the limitations of the recruitment process (managed by the governments of
countries of origin), and once again, excessively long administrative
procedures.
Given the limitations of the quota system, in 2004, with the PSOE again
in power, the general regime was restored. The idea behind this decision
was that those employers who wanted to hire a foreign worker in particular
or who had not anticipated their labour needs in time to be accounted for
in the quota system would still have the opportunity to undertake nomina-
tive employment of foreign workers. From this point onwards, in order to
facilitate procedures in those sectors with huge staff shortages, the Spanish
government has issued a quarterly list of occupations in which nominative
employment of foreign workers is permitted without first having to conduct
a labour market test. The national employment office disseminates this list
to the regional governments, where it is discussed at the regional level with
employer organisations and trade unions. Ultimately, the list is approved in
the Tripartite Labour Commission, which features representation by the
Ministry of Labour, Spain’s largest employer organisation (CEOE) and the
two largest trade unions (CCOO, UGT).
Since 2004, the general regime has become the mechanism par excel-
lence for entry into the country. Between June 2004 and June 2007,
352,307 authorisations were processed under this system. Consolidation of
the general regime as the main form of entry should be explained firstly by
the fact that it was not limited by an annual ceiling and secondly by the ex-
istence of significant social networks among immigrants already in the
country as well as those yet to come. In other words, these networks have
been used to contract new migrants in countries of origin. As such, immi-
grant social networks have come to fulfil the function of mediation, some-
thing which the state has not yet been able to achieve.
After more than twenty years of entry rules and regulations, Spanish pol-
icymaking has had its own distinct development. Parallel to the gradual
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deployment of a more comprehensive set of policies, there has been a shift
from a policy based on discretionary, administrative evaluations of labour
needs to a policy based on political decision-making. Such decisions were
first made by the Spanish government alone and, from 2000 onwards, by
the Spanish government along with regional governments, employer orga-
nisations and trade unions. Our first analysis of the attitudes of the differ-
ent partners involved reveals that regional governments have not always
been in favour of open-entry policies. Secondly, while employer organisa-
tions have commonly claimed less restrictive policies, their position has
varied according to region and depending on whether medium and small
companies were represented. Finally, trade unions have often been reluc-
tant to an open-labour migration policy. While they have pushed for the le-
galisation of irregular migrants who are already present in the country,
trade unions have had a much more restrictive position regarding the en-
trance of new migrants.
4.2 Regularisation
In view of how entrance has actually been controlled, it is no wonder that
regularisations have constituted the primary avenue for conferring legal sta-
tus in Spain. Concretely speaking, the easiest and most common way to
obtain a legal status had been to enter with a tourist visa, work illegally for
a while and then get regularised in one of the frequent regularisation pro-
grammes. Between 1985 and 2005, six exceptional regularisation processes
were implemented (in 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005).28
Moreover, the general regime and, in particular, the quota system have of-
ten functioned as regularisation programmes. Since 2004, individual regu-
larisation (referred to as arraigo – ‘rooting’ in English) has been possible
once a migrant has lived in Spain for two years and has established a work
relationship of at least one year (arraigo laboral) or three years and the
prospect of entering into a work contract (arraigo social).
The Spanish government has given different reasons for implementing
extraordinary regularisation programmes. For one, the government
launched different regularisation programmes to reduce the stocks of irre-
gular migrants that had been generated through previous procedures before
introducing a new immigration law or regulation (in 1986, 1991, 1996,
2000 and 2005). Regularisation programmes also emerged in reaction to
pressure by migrants and their supporters (e.g. protests in churches in
2001). Moreover, the manifestation of particular events, as selected and
amplified by the media, spurred on regularisation programmes. These
events, such as 2001’s fatal accident involving Ecuadorian workers, often
called attention to the precarious life of irregular migrants.29 Finally, the
government also argued, most remarkably in 2005, that regularisation pro-
grammes were necessary in order to reduce the underground economy and
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therefore benefit both migrants (by improving their working and living
conditions) and Spanish society (through more taxes and social security
contributions).
Most regularisations required conditions of residency and work to be
fulfilled. While residence was normally demonstrated through registration
in the municipality (known as Padrón Municipal de Habitantes), in 2000
and 2001, passport entry stamps, boarding tickets, utility bills and other si-
milar documents could also be used for this purpose. In 2005, following a
number of demonstrations in Barcelona and Madrid, seven other docu-
ments (e.g. official health cards, expulsion orders, rejected registration
applications, asylum applications) were also deemed applicable for regis-
tration ‘by omission’. Exceptionally, a special programme was launched in
1996 to regularise those migrants who had fallen back into irregularity. In
this case, potential regularised migrants had to prove that they had been in
possession of an earlier residence or work permit. Finally, labour require-
ments were also instated through some regularisation programmes (in
1986, 1991 and 2005), which, in practice, meant that only workers in the
formal economy got regularised. Most noticeably, in the regularisation of
2005, eligibility was dependent on the prospect of a bona fide work con-
tract of at least six months.
Although making immigration policies has always been the sole compe-
tence of the national authorities, regularisations may to a great extent be
considered the product of bottom-up pressures. Concerned by the difficult
situation of many irregular immigrants living in Spain, numerous NGOs,
trade unions and other social activists have compelled governments to en-
force such regularisations by, for example, exerting political pressure in
Parliament. The underlying motivation for such petitions was to promote
amnesty in the name of justice, though there was not always consensus on
the ultimate goals at stake. In this regard, regularisations have often di-
vided social movements. Depending on their expectations, immigrants
themselves have cultivated a range of stances: from more moderate, colla-
boratively oriented positions to the more oppositional and radically
defined.
Employers have generally taken a favourable position vis-à-vis regulari-
sation processes. Among smaller companies especially, employers have
been grateful for the opportunity to regularise the situation of many of their
already employed irregular immigrants. Following the trend throughout
Europe, Spanish trade unions have expressed worry about the possible ne-
gative impact immigrant workers might have on wages and employment
opportunities for native workers, but they – much more than other actors –
have demonstrated a positive attitude towards immigration and immigrants
(Watts 1998; Calavita 2003; Cachon & Valles 2003). Trade unions have
extended their services to immigrant workers, basically regarding them as
potential new members through which to reinforce their social presence.
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This stance may have something to do with the fact that Spain’s dominant
trade unions have traditionally had a left-wing political orientation. At the
same time, it is also plausible that the remarkable expansion of the Spanish
economy during the last decade and the importance of the country’s black
economy have encouraged the positive attitude among trade unions.
Finally, although some autonomous communities and municipalities
have asked the central government to examine the prospect of opening reg-
ularisation processes, the role of regional and local authorities has been
modest. Any participation on their part has mainly been motivated by the
development of specific programmes for the social integration of immi-
grants, or as a result of pressure by social movements. Since 2000, autono-
mous communities have been key actors in the implementation of regulari-
sation programmes. While the gradual decentralisation of regularisation
programmes increased the state’s administrative response capacity, it also
introduced important regional differences in the evaluation of applications
(Ramos Gallarín & Bazaga Fernández 2002).
5 Integration policies and policymaking
Telling the diffuse story of integration policymaking in Spain and the con-
sequent involvement of different actors presents more challenges than de-
scribing immigration’s well-centralised policies. Giving due attention to the
various dimensions at stake in this analysis, we will first make some gener-
al remarks on the policymaking process and then outline its mechanisms.
These mechanisms will be examined on three levels: the national; the local
and regional; and from the perspective of non-governmental actors in-
volved in both national and local policies.
As already discussed, up until to 2004, policymaking efforts at the na-
tional level primarily focused on the immigration field. The elaboration of
integration policies mostly occurred on the regional and local levels for
three reasons. Firstly, until 2004, Spain’s management of migration in
many ways resembled the guest-worker policies of Northern European
states during the 1960s. Specifically, this means that a labour approach pre-
vailed and the state’s main preoccupation was immigration control and reg-
ulation, thereby relegating integration to second place. At the national
level, policymaking in formal governmental and parliamentary arenas had
basically taken shape in negotiations of the Foreigners Law.
Secondly, the sub-national level became the locus of integration policy-
making as a consequence of the division of tasks between levels that the
established system of autonomous communities. As we described in the
third section of this chapter, while the national government manages immi-
gration, sub-national governments have competence for promoting the ac-
commodation of immigrants: regional and local governments are thus
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responsible for the policy measures involved in integration (health care,
education, social assistance, labour and housing).30 The national policies
for integration GRECO (2000) and PECI (2006) would later institutionalise
de facto distribution of responsibilities territorial tiers. This division of
work no doubt had consequences for policymaking: namely, the difficult
coordination between administrations and the heterogeneity of policies and
processes.
More than anything else, this distribution of tasks in the elaboration of
policies implies extreme separation between the policy fields of immigra-
tion and integration, and their respective networks and policymaking logics
(Tamayo & Carrillo 2002). The two separate spheres follow divergent lo-
gics: the national government endeavours to restrict the entrance of mi-
grants, while the autonomous communities and municipalities seek to make
irregular migrants visible so as to develop policies that improve their living
situation. Although the policy areas operate separately from one other, de-
velopments in the sphere of integration are hierarchically determined by
those in migration. This helps explain how the three national plans for inte-
gration developed.
Parliamentary debates over the Foreigners Law have gradually come to
deal with the negative ramifications it had for migrants’ integration into
society. In such debates, the ‘integration of migrants’ has become an ideo-
logical position in and of itself, eventually coming to oppose restrictive
positions on migration (Moreno Fuentes 2004). This stance is harnessed by
the view that integration policies embody ‘the protection of human rights’
or ‘the defence of equal opportunities’ – beliefs that have been promoted
largely by social organisations.
Thirdly, integration policymaking in Spain has shifted out of the political
arena and downwards to the sub-national levels. One important explanation
for this shift is that Spanish political elites at the national level have shown
little inclination to negotiate, while at the same time they are increasingly
dependent on such negotiations between political forces to reach governing
coalitions (Gomà & Subirats 1998; Gallego, Gomà & Subirats 2003). This
tendency has been propelled ever since the polarisation of Spain’s two ma-
jor political parties in 2004, leading up to the present-day’s political cli-
mate marked by division and great hostility. As such, policymaking at
Spain’s national level is complicated. When it comes to integration issues,
the political agenda has become narrower in scope, while simultaneously
undergoing shifts downwards, to the regional level, and outwards, to the
administrative sphere.31
5.1 National developments
Although the principal activities of integration policymaking transpire at
sub-national levels, the national level has witnessed three benchmarks in
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policymaking: the Plan for Social Integration of Immigrants (1994),
GRECO (2000) and PECI (2006). These national policy initiatives have
been triggered by bottom-up pressure exerted by sub-national public
administrations (i.e. regions and municipalities) and civil society organisa-
tions. A significant amount of emulation has also taken place whereby pol-
icy concepts and models are patterned after the regional and local levels.
As demonstrated in this chapter’s third section, the first generation of
legislative initiatives in the 1980s dealt almost exclusively with the regula-
tion of immigration itself, something that had been foremost defined as a
temporary phenomenon. Spain’s main motive for developing these initia-
tives was to secure imminent access to the European Economic
Community, as opposed to any urgency, per se, of migration developments
in the country. This explains the relative absence of societal actors in the
process of creating these first-generation laws and regulations. Within such
a framework, developing policy measures to facilitate immigrant settlement
and the process of becoming a multicultural society could not be given po-
litical priority.32 The situation changed, however, in the 1990s. During this
decade, more and more actors in Spanish society, particularly at the regio-
nal and the local levels, could face the consequences of a steadily growing
immigrant population as well as the implications of its management. From
the very start of the decade, societal action and political mobilisation
pressed for immigration regulations that would create a better basis for in-
tegration at the local level (e.g. regularisations and rights for family reunifi-
cation and for minors). This did, in fact, lead to a number of changes dur-
ing the mid-1990s, and it also pressured the government to formulate an
explicit integration policy. A crucial event was the signing of the
Declaration of Girona by a number of civil society organisations in 1992.
This document backed the statement that public administrations should de-
velop a comprehensive integration policy, beyond a mere contention of
problems. It also acknowledged the need for giving specialised attention to
immigrants.
This societal insistence led to the Plan for Social Integration of
Immigrants, as launched in 1994 by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Despite
being a response to pressure from the grass-roots level, the plan was pro-
duced in Spain’s administrative arena without any political or social de-
bate. Furthermore, several authors suggest that this plan was inspired by –
if not patterned upon – the 1993 Catalonian Plan (Cais 2004; Zapata-
Barrero 2002). Following in Catalonia’s footsteps, the national plan
showed striking similarities to the former plan in its institutional structure,
particularly in terms of instruments promoting interdepartmental coopera-
tion and social participation (e.g. the Forum).
In the formal sense, integration policies were introduced at the national
level, a novel development. But, in practice, the importance of the 1994
plan was something more symbolic, acknowledging for the first time that
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‘integration’ was a policy goal (Pajares 2004). The plan, however, led to
meagre results, which were not only due to the scarcity of allocated re-
sources, but also difficulties in coordinating the multiplicities of institutions
involved. As evaluation by the Ministry of Labour and Social Issues
(IMSERSO 1998) concluded, Spain’s first attempt to promote its integra-
tion of immigrants was little more than a rhetorical effort; there were
mismatches between the plan’s intended goals and the economic, adminis-
trative and human resources actually available. Moreover, the various insti-
tutions involved held contradictory opinions on the issue. The clashing
views of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs are a case in point (Gil Araujo 2002).
The new national regulation known as GRECO was launched in 2000.
Once again, the plan was designed by civil servants behind closed doors in
the Ministry of Interior. GRECO focused mostly on border control, with
only one of its four guidelines dealing with integration. The plan’s argu-
ments follow that good management of migration in Spain means restrict-
ing the number of labour migrants so that national labour offers match
demands for foreign work. Two key measures for accomplishing this are
the strict control of flows and the promotion of migrants’ return to their
country of origin. The plan did not establish concrete measures or guide-
lines for sub-national actors, and neither was it backed by any specific
allocation of financial resources (Pajares 2004). GRECO emerged in an ex-
tremely thorny historical context. The period was benchmarked by the pro-
gressive Foreigners Law 4/2000’s reformation into its more restrictive
8/2000 version, 2001’s regularisation process, national and regional elec-
tions and several mobilisations among citizens from both pro-migrant and
anti-migrant sides. Transferring the immigration portfolio to the Ministry
of Interior was another sign of the paradigm shift brought about by the PP
government. Integration was not their first priority, and this was reflected
not only in the policy’s two main rationales but also in the actual expenses
reflected in the annual reports (Delegación de Gobierno para la Extranjería
y la Inmigración 2002).33 It is not farfetched to conclude thus that, in this
case, integration was a political goal only to the extent that it contributed
to immigrants’ return to their home countries. And, moreover, it helped
maintain the status quo of a restrictive immigration policy.
Finally, 2004 saw production of the first real national framework policy
for the promotion of integration. Increasing social pressures and the topic’s
gradual politicisation upped integration policy on a national political agen-
da being developed by the new social-democratic government. Promoting
equality of immigrants nationwide was the main goal of the ambitious
PECI 2006. For the first time, these national guidelines were backed by fi-
nancial commitment – an allotted budget in which E 2,005 million were
set for 2007-2010. The funding was to be proportionately distributed
among the regions according to their immigrant population percentages as
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well as among the municipalities, for the first time thus recognising the im-
portant role of local authorities. In addition, the national integration budget
sanctioned those regional policies that complied with national guidelines,
although autonomous communities could still cultivate their own
integration policy.
There are notable differences in these consecutive national plans and the
actors who subsequently participated in their elaborations. While all three
plans share a technocratic policymaking style that lacks much parliamen-
tary discussion between parties, PECI stands out for having a relatively
pro-participation nature. PECI was drafted by independently operating spe-
cialists who had also considered recommendations produced by several ex-
pert seminars. Although regional and local authorities and civil society
were not included in the discussions leading to its drafting, the plan was
subsequently subjected to widespread consultation.
5.2 Regional and local developments
The description thus far detailing the evolution of integration policies at
the national level can sometimes overshadow some of the earliest develop-
ments that took place at the regional and the local levels. But policy initia-
tives and negotiations among their different actors had been taking place in
this realm since the mid-1990s (FEMP 1995; Maluquer 1997; Nadal,
Oliveres & Alegre 2003). The region of Catalonia, in particular, was a pio-
neer, having developed the first regional plan for integration in 1993.
Other regions launched their own policies more recently, in 2000 or 2001.
They include Madrid, Andalucía, Baleares, Canarias, Navarra and Aragón,
all of which have high migrant percentages. Already in the mid-1990s, a
number of municipalities were launching policies, only to become more
widespread at the turn of the millennium. In addition, some municipalities
and social organisations such as NGOs, trade unions and migrant associa-
tions came to proactively promote the issue on the national political agenda
(Casey 1998b; Agrela Romero & Gil Araujo 2005).
In the absence of a guiding national policy, regional and local authorities
regularly took initiatives to develop integration plans. This has resulted in
great variety in the form, content, involvement of relevant actors and im-
plementation of local and regional policies. Above all, diversity in policy-
making processes has led to considerable inequalities across regions and ci-
ties (Diez Bueso 2003), particularly since more empowered autonomous
communities tend to develop their own policies while others do not. As a
result, an immigrant’s place of residence has a direct bearing on his or her
access to welfare services (Martínez de Lizarrondo 2006). It is commonly
assumed that this only exacerbates the uneven geographical distribution of
immigration, for populations tend to move to regions and localities that
will offer more favourable conditions.34 The inconsistencies may also
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create tensions between administrations concerning who has to foot the bill
for the integration. The Catalonian Plan, for instance, lacked a clear finan-
cial budget because according to Catalonian policymakers, the central state
was responsible for funding integration policies (Pajares 2004).
Despite the differences, regional and local policymaking processes also
show important similarities. Firstly, when it comes to actual policy content,
there are striking resemblances among regional plans’ general principles
and goals (Martínez de Lizarrondo 2006). Basic principles framing regio-
nal policies are equal rights and opportunities for migrants, normalisation
(or the tendency to resort to general policies), transversality, gender equal-
ity, decentralisation and social participation (Pajares 2004). An important
feature shared by both regional and local levels is that they seldom distin-
guish between regular and irregular migrants. If and when they do, how-
ever, the distinction tends to vanish upon policy implementation.35 This
has had implications for the policymaking process, particularly because not
distinguishing between legal and illegal36 immigrants in fact promotes the
registration of irregular migrants in municipal registers. This identification
works as the onset of a sort of partial regularisation process.37 Sub-national
governments ‘survive’ by making irregular migrants visible; this allows
them to develop policies and services for migrants and to negotiate fiscal
compensations with the central government (Tamayo & Carrillo 2002).
Still, despite this general tendency, the legal status of migrants implies dif-
ferent levels of access to social-protection schemes depending on region or
municipality. In some regions, undocumented migrants are often chan-
nelled towards special charity programmes supplied by private agencies
and NGOs, although de jure they should have access to the general social
schemes as long as they are listed in the municipal register (Agrela
Romero & Gil Araujo 2005).
Secondly, we find similarities regarding decision-making styles.
Regional and local plans have tended to be reactive in nature, focusing on
preventing serious problems (marginality, violence, insecurity, exploitation,
etc.). Analysis of the type of integration instruments developed shows how
such actions have mainly taken place in first reception services and the so-
cial services sector (Tamayo & Carrillo 2002; Bruquetas-Callejo 2007;
Martínez de Lizarrondo 2006). These priorities can be explained by the
fact that sub-national actors have little influence over the growth of immi-
grant populations in their territory. Sub-national governments experience
the direct consequences of this growth, yet they lack the resources and
technical capacity to handle them. Inaction by some regional governments
overloads the local authorities with responsibility.
Regional and local policies can generally be characterised as techno-
cratic in their development, being designed behind closed doors by civil
servants and internal experts. As such, there is little political discussion
and negotiation between actors. A minority of regions (e.g. Navarra) has
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managed to cultivate greater interaction among independent experts,38 civil
society actors and immigrants themselves. The dominance of policymaking
in the administrative arena has led to plans often contradicting the political
intentions and goals of the political elites in power. For example, the
Catalonia Plan (1993, 1998), wove a symbolic banner for multiculturalism
and yet still deployed instruments promoting the importance of the
Catalonian language and culture vis-à-vis immigrant integration (Cais
2004).
Despite the predominance of civil servants as actors, regions reflect a
great diversity of policy actors involved in the decision-making network.
Zapata-Barrero (2003a) has made a quantitative effort to describe different
networks operating per region. He found that, while in some regions public
administration clearly dominates the process (e.g. Andalusia), in others,
pressure groups play the most important role, followed by NGOs and im-
migrant organisations (e.g. Catalonia, where public administration mod-
estly figures at third place). Under the category of ‘interest groups’,
Zapata-Barrero includes trade unions, religious organisations, employer or-
ganisations, federations and foundations.
Thirdly, within the dimension of implementation, the networks of actors
involved varies not only per locality, but also policy sector. Whereas in
some sectors (e.g. education) there is an obvious predominance of public
actors and residual participation by private and social actors, other sectors
(e.g. social services) have management networks largely linking the regio-
nal administration and the civil society actors. At the other end of the spec-
trum are examples of bottom-up experiences at the regional and local le-
vels. For instance, Catalonia has had cases of self-organisation among citi-
zens that have produced compelling policymaking initiatives and networks
(Pascual 1997; Morén-Alegret 2002a, 2002b).
However, there is evidently a dominant national pattern in which a ma-
jority of autonomous communities have made first reception a top priority
and thus assigned integration management to the Social Services
Department (Martínez de Lizarrondo 2006). These autonomous commu-
nities transfer part of their responsibilities for first reception to NGOs and
other social actors, who function as subsidised policy implementers. In
their study on the Community of Madrid, Tamayo and Carrillo (2002) de-
scribed such a network of actors – comprising the regional administration
and non-governmental actors – whose relations are based on two basic
instruments: the system of conditioned subventions and the contracts for
service delivery. The Centros de Atención Social a Inmigrantes (CASI) net-
work in Madrid and the Service for Attention to Immigrants and Refugees
(SAEIR) in Barcelona are illustrations of how the management of social is-
sues was transferred from the regional government to NGOs and private
companies (Gil Araújo 2004; Bruquetas-Callejo 2007).
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5.3 Civil society
Actors from Spanish civil society39 have had a remarkable presence in the
domain of integration policies. First of all, they have been the frontline
providers of basic services for immigrants since the very beginning of their
settlement in Spain, during the mid-1980s. Beyond purely implementing
regional or local policies, social organisations formulate their own projects
and seek the subsidies of public authorities. These actors have delivered a
broad array of services, including juridical support, reception facilities, lan-
guage training, employment services, health care, child after-school pro-
grammes, adult education and home rental intermediation. In addition, as
mentioned earlier, these actors have actually tried to influence policymak-
ing by explicitly demanding that public administrations develop integration
schemes. Their efforts have had at least two visible results: placing immi-
grant integration on the political agenda (Girona Report, CAONGCG
1992) and swaying public opinion to favour migrants and support the
granting of equal rights to foreigners on grounds of residence (in particular,
the right to benefit from welfare state provisions). In a noticeable way, this
has framed the issue of integration in terms of human rights and equal op-
portunities for migrants.
Nonetheless, civil society organisations have not had a substantial influ-
ence on the decision-making processes of integration policies in formal
arenas. Casey (1998a, 1998c) concludes that, until the mid-1990s, Spanish
NGOs had not yet been able to establish themselves as strong, independent
actors in policy processes related to immigration and integration. Yet, their
indirect role was crucial for pushing the issue on the political agenda and
influencing how a particular problem might be defined. Public authorities
also came to recognise the legitimacy that social actors had in the policy
domain because of their access to migrant groups. While public measures
primarily apply general schemes, authorities have found it useful to arrange
special measures for immigrants through social organisations (Agrela
Romero & Gil Araujo 2005; Dietz 2000).
There are three main factors that explain why participation by social or-
ganisations has merely remained indirect and variable, not reaching a more
structured position in the decision-making process. We identify the ineffi-
ciency of the instruments developed for the participation of social actors
(e.g. the Forum), the strong financial dependence social organisations have
on public administration and the lack of coordination among social organi-
sations. As mentioned above, social actors such as NGOs and immigrant
associations have often been given specific tasks (and budgets) to imple-
ment integration policies at the local and regional levels. This delegation
changed the position of such partners vis-à-vis administrative and political
authorities and, to a certain extent, may have altered their very nature.
Many organisations that initially consisted almost exclusively of volunteers
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now have a significant percentage of contracted personnel in order to pro-
vide services that are subcontracted or promoted by public administration.
In many cases, this has meant that both the voluntary nature and ideologi-
cal impetus of NGOs take a backseat. Moreover, such organisations have
become very economically dependent on public administration.40
6 Conclusions
Spanish policymaking in the fields of immigration and integration presents
several salient features. Fundamental is a separation of the policymaking
system into the two distinct subsystems of immigration and integration.
Although in other countries one policymaking model predominates (at least
for certain periods of time), in Spain, a bipolar model prevails. Pressure to
link these two fields has been mounting since the mid-1990s. One sign of
this is the demand some autonomous communities make for obtaining
competence in migration. The demand has been backed by the argument
that, without such responsibilities, regions cannot produce effective integra-
tion policies. However, the path towards greater interdependence between
the two fields has not evolved into a single, unique model. As such, the
immigration and integration policy subsystems still function highly inde-
pendently. Each field has its own predominating operational logic and ac-
companying set of actors that participate in decision-making processes.
The distribution of responsibilities within the autonomous community
system means that in each field distinct actors and different levels of
authority take responsibility for formulating policies. This governance pat-
tern thus entails dissimilar policymaking strategies. As for immigration, the
national government has had total responsibility over the related decision-
making, and policymaking has consequently followed a distinct top-down
direction. In the field of integration, the Spanish central government had
until only recently been reluctant to dedicate significant efforts to integra-
tion policies. Decentralisation of social policies has assigned integration
responsibilities to the regions and municipalities. Bottom-up responses
have thus been extraordinarily diverse when compared across autonomous
communities, municipalities and civil society organisations.
Another difference between the two policymaking subsystems is the de-
gree of continuity. While the field of migration is characterised by relative
continuity, integration is quite the opposite. Interventions in immigration
policy have proven considerably consistent over time and throughout poli-
tical changes because the field has been dominated by a single actor –
namely, the central state. The policy style predominating Spanish politics
also helps account for the degree of continuity in each subsystem: political
elites are described as residing in a position somewhere between little incli-
nation to negotiate between parties and the need to do so for the sake of
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reaching governing coalitions. In the latter instance, changes in immigra-
tion policy have often been approached through modification of an imple-
menting regulation, as opposed to substitution with a brand-new one. The
consistency of migration policy may also be explained by the fact that
Spain’s main political parties (the PSOE and the PP) have had rather simi-
lar approaches. By contrast, stances on integration have been dissimilar –
if not altogether conflicting – particularly on the issue of access to welfare
services for irregular immigrants. In this regard, political colour seems a vi-
able variable, running the gamut of positions within the field of integration.
Since integration policies imply more political conflict between political
parties, they have been regionalised and localised, as well as mostly ap-
proached through administrative regulations.
The subsystems have also been receptive to dissimilar contextual factors
in the framing of policies. When it comes to immigration, the EU has
played a leading role in initiating policymaking. These efforts were under-
taken before immigration had even become a significant phenomenon and,
later, in response to pressure to conform with general EU rules and princi-
ples. As for integration, grass-roots organisations and local authorities have
created bottom-up pressure to trigger policymaking from below. The immi-
gration/integration issue came to be defined in a highly politicised climate.
It was shaped by several political mobilisations that were both pro and
against migrants (such as racist events in El Ejido and Can Anglada and
mobilisations of irregular migrants demanding residence and work permits
in Barcelona and other major cities). The balance that developed between
these forces can be read from the different versions of the Foreigners Law:
while in the first and third versions of the law (8/2000) a European-wide
top-down pressure dominated, the second version (4/2000) tried to intro-
duce the logic of integration and to respond to the specificity of local
needs.
These general tendencies, as they evolved over the years, need to be
viewed in a nuanced light. Two elements should be noted in particular.
First, although the domains are seen as distinct, the attention immigration
gets undoubtedly dominates that given to integration. As such, the policy
goals of the former have priority over those of the latter. The heavy empha-
sis on labour explains not only the chronology of integration policies, but
also their reactionary character and primary focus on first reception.
Second, within the field of immigration, social actors have put bottom-up
pressure on regional and local governments to produce regularisations.
Since regularisation has come to represent the primary avenue for confer-
ring legal status, we deduce that immigration policies have, in practice,
gone far beyond national authorities’ competence.
Finally, this policymaking pattern has revealed inconsistencies. More
than anything else, exceedingly separate relations between policy actors
have produced two fundamental paradoxes. The first is that the model
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lacks inter-governmental instruments that can guarantee the coherence of
policies. Each domain operates independently and the facilities meant to
integrate these two policy areas (government delegation, Institute of
Migrations and Social Services, the Forum and the Superior Council for
Migration Policy) have proved insufficient. Furthermore, the regionalisa-
tion and localisation of integration policies has been implemented without
sufficient coordination between administrations and sectors. An absence of
multilevel cooperation reflects a broad problematic within the system of
the Spanish autonomous communities. The state has established a very de-
centralised power structure without resolving the articulation of the whole
system in a satisfactory way (Aja 1999).
The second paradox is that even though organised civil society has no
formal access to decision-making forums, civil society organisations have
brought integration policy to fruition, both informally and at the operative
level. Public authorities have even mimicked these civic initiatives. Up
until recently, the framing of policies at the national level has tended to
produce measures in immigration, rather than integration. This opened up
opportunities for social organisations to generate a number of integration-
related initiatives on all levels. A lack of receptivity towards stakeholders
and civil society and a lack of coordination among social organisations has
nonetheless stymied the potential impact such actors could have on
policymaking.
Notes
1 Unless specified otherwise, the terms ‘immigration’ and ‘immigrant’ are used in re-
ference to non-Spanish migrants.
2 On 1 January 2007, National Institute of Statistics (INE) data accounted for
45,200,737 inhabitants of Spain (http://www.ine.es); among this population were
4,519,554 foreign residents, or 9.99 per cent of the total population (not including
immigrants who acquired Spanish nationality).
3 Ley 7/1985, Orga´nica de Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en Espan˜a
(Organic Law of Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain) of 1 July 1985.
4 Ley 5/1984, Reguladora del Derecho de Asilo y de la Condicio´n de Refugiado (Law
Regulating the Right to Asylum and the Condition of the Refugee) of 26 March
1984.
5 Reglamento de desarrollo. A regulation is a form of secondary legislation used to
implement a primary piece of legislation appropriately.
6 Royal Decree 19 November1986.
7 Real Decreto 766/1992, Sobre Entrada y Permanencia en Espan˜a de Nacionales de
Estados Miembros de las Comunidades Europeas (Royal Decree on Entry and
Residence of Citizens of the Member States of the European Communities) of 26
June 1986.
8 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 23 November 1984.
9 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 7 July 1987.
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10 Although there was no general prohibition, the exertion of these rights by foreigners
needed prior authorisation by public authorities. This provoked a de facto limitation
on the right of association as well as the right to meet.
11 Izquierda Unida.
12 Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol.
13 Law 9/1994 of 19 May 1994.
14 Royal Decree 203/1995 of 10 February 1995.
15 Royal Decree 155/1996 of 2 February 1996.
16 The Forum’s current status is regulated in Royal Decree 367/2001 of 4 April 2001.
17 The national policies for integration (GRECO (2000) and PECI (2006)) have institu-
tionalised a de facto distribution of tasks.
18 Some of these responsibilities are shared with the local administrations.
19 Law 4/2000 of 11 January 2000.
20 Partido Popular.
21 For the period 1996-2000, the PP was in power with just a relative majority.
22 Law 8/2000 of 22 December 2000.
23 Royal Decree 864/2001 of 20 July 2001.
24 Its application spanned the period 2000-2004.
25 Law 14/2003 of 20 November 2003.
26 Judgments of the Constitutional Court number 236 of 7 November 2007 and num-
ber 259 of 19 December 2007.
27 Royal Decree 2393/2004 of 30 December 2004.
28 The 1990s also saw specific regularisation programmes implemented to solve con-
frontational situations in the border cities of Ceuta and Melilla. These programmes
permitted irregular migrants to get a one-year residence permit without having to
undergo the standard process. In exchange, the government required active colla-
boration from NGOs who would see to it that immigrants could move to the penin-
sula. There they were to be granted some basic reception provisions, a gesture
meant to counterbalance the negative impact of their irregular arrival.
29 On 3 January 2001, in the Murcian city of Lorca, twelve Ecuadorian migrants on
their way to work were killed when their van was hit by a train. Widely covered by
regional and national media, the event brought attention to the workers’ living and
labour conditions, thus publicising the precarious situation of many migrants in
Spain.
30 Some of these responsibilities are shared with the local administrations.
31 The confrontation between the party in power (the moderate social-democratic
PSOE) and the opposition’s main party (the conservative PP) has compelled the gov-
ernment to minimise the number of issues on the political agenda. As an energy-
saving strategy, points of conflict thus become very focused, while many other issues
get delegated to bureaucrats so as to reduce general political confrontation.
32 This is also reflected in research: studies dealing with the elaboration processes of
integration policy are rather scarce (Tamayo & Carrillo 2002; Zapata 2002c, 2003;
Ramos et al. 1998), while studies dealing with immigration policy are more com-
mon (Tamayo & Delgado 1998; Carrillo & Delgado 1998; Ramos & Bazaga 2002;
Goma & Subirats 1996; Lopez Sala 2005). Few studies deal with both policy fields
(Casey 1998; Agrela Romero & Gil Araujo 2005).
33 The 2002 Report of the Delegation of Government for Alien Policy and
Immigration declares an expenditure of E 252 million on border control, centres of
reclusion and services for asylum seekers and foreigners. In contrast, investments
in integration are considerably less: E 9 million for the covenants with regions;
E 12.6 million for subventions to social organisations offering services to migrants;
and sundry funds given to refugee and immigrant reception centres.
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34 However, evidence in this regard is inconclusive. See general discussions on the
Welfare Magnet Theory.
35 According to Martı´nez de Lizarrondo (2006), Madrid is the only region that formally
excludes irregular migrants from public (specialised) services. However, Tamayo and
Carrillo (2002) aver that this policy gets blurred in practice.
36 Throughout this chapter, the terms ‘irregular’, ‘illegal’ and ‘undocumented’ are used
synonymously when referring to migrants.
37 As Solanes Corella (2004) observes, the municipal register is a double-edged sword.
Local governments, in collaboration with regional ones, tend to use it as a mechan-
ism of inclusion – by extending service access to all undocumented foreigners who
register as residents (as sanctioned by law 4/2000) – rather than as an instrument
of control – by trying to protect registry data from police access (as permitted by law
8/2000).
38 The formulation of policies by public officers often implies that experts within the
administration develop measures. Some regions have developed public services that
specialise in supporting local authorities in the elaboration of integration policies
(for instance, CRID in Catalonia).
39 One basic typology of civil society organisations distinguishes between Spanish
NGOs supporting immigrants and associations of immigrants (Casey 1998). The
former focus on delivering services for migrants, while the latter tend to take up po-
litical representation duties in public institutions. Since the former task list impli-
cates more resources and thus more influence than the latter, tensions are likely to
arise among the various social actors (Tamayo & Carrillo 2002). Other immigrant-
supporting organisations include trade unions, cultural associations and sponta-
neously formed groups that mobilise for specific migrant causes.
40 Ruiz Vieytez (2003: 186) highlights four additional changes that may take place
within such organisations: diminishment of a long-term strategy; influence by per-
sonal or practical interests within the organisation; loss of a culture of inter-organi-
sational coordination and networking; and a weakening international presence.
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